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INTRODUCTION
While the Affordable Care Act ("ACA")' will do much to
improve access to health care,2 it may do far less to address other
problems in health care and health, generally. For example, scholars
have questioned whether the ACA will have a big enough impact on
health care costs.3 The United States spends far more on health care
* @ 2014 David Orentlicher.
** Samuel R. Rosen Professor and Co-Director, Hall Center for Law and Health,
Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law; Adjunct Professor of Medicine,
Indiana University School of Medicine. MD, JD, Harvard University. I am grateful for the
excellent editing by Anna Tison and the other editors of the North Carolina Law Review
who contributed to this Article.
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25, 26, 29 and 42 U.S.C.).
2. By prohibiting premium surcharges for sicker individuals and providing greater
funding for lower-income families, the ACA will ensure that millions more Americans can
afford the medical care that they need. Funding for lower-income families takes two
primary forms. First, millions more of the poor will be eligible for Medicaid under the
ACA's Medicaid expansion provisions, which provide for coverage to all persons whose
family income does not exceed 138% of the federal poverty level. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i) (2012); Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard & Kevin
Outterson, Plunging into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 6, 12 & n.55 (2013).
See generally Mark A. Hall, States' Decisions not to Expand Medicaid, 92 N.C. L. REV.
1459 (2014) (discussing the Medicaid gap). As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in
National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), states
have the option whether to implement the expansion. Second, for persons with an income
between 100% and 400% of the federal poverty level, federal subsidies will be available
for the purchase of health care insurance on the ACA's insurance exchanges. See 26
U.S.C. § 36B (2012).
3. See, e.g., Jonathan Gruber, Perspective, The Cost Implications of Health Care
Reform, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2050, 2051 (2010) (questioning how much the ACA will
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than other countries without noticeable benefits for the health of
Americans from the much greater expenditures,' and it does not
appear that the ACA will solve this mismatch between costs and
benefits.'
This Article considers another important defect in the ACA.
Experts have recognized that health depends to a substantial extent
on the choices that people make about diet, exercise, and other daily
behaviors. Optimal health care reform not only would ensure that
people receive medical care when they become sick. It also would
reduce the need for medical care by promoting healthier behavior.
Through a number of its provisions, the ACA tries to promote
healthier choices by Americans. However, some of the key ACA
provisions for encouraging healthy lifestyles may be ineffective at
best and counterproductive at worst.
In particular, Congress came up short when it tried to improve
individual decisions about nutrition, exercise, and other lifestyle
choices that are important to personal health. The ACA tries to
encourage better dietary decisions with its menu labeling
requirements, but those are likely to have little impact. Moreover, the
Act's promotion of employer wellness programs may actually
undermine the ACA's efforts to improve access to health care.'
While the government should do more to encourage good
decisions about health by the public, it needs to do a much better job
of basing its policies on empirical evidence. To the extent that
research studies indicate which kinds of wellness policies are likely to
slow the rate of growth in health care costs); David Orentlicher, Cost Containment and the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 6 FLA. INT'L U. L. REv. 67, 67-68 (2010)
(explaining that the ACA does more to increase access to health care than it does to cut
health care costs).
4. See Orentlicher, supra note 3, at 68-69.
5. See id. at 84.
6. See J. Michael McGinnis, Pamela Williams-Russo & James R. Knickman, The
Case for More Active Policy Attention to Health Promotion, 21 HEALTH AFF. 78, 82
(2002).
7. The menu labeling provisions require restaurants to disclose calorie information
for the foods that they sell. See 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5)(H) (2012). The definition of "food"
includes beverages. See id. § 321(f)(1). The wellness program provisions allow employers
to impose a thirty percent surcharge on health insurance premiums for employees who fail
to satisfy employer-specified health targets, such as a reduced weight or lower blood sugar.
See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(A) (2012). For further discussion of this provision, see
generally Kristin M. Madison, Kevin G. Volpp & Scott D. Halpern, The Law, Policy &
Ethics of Employers' Use of Financial Incentives to Improve Health, 39 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 450, 451 (2011). For further discussion on the menu labeling and employer
wellness program provisions, see infra Parts II, III.
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work and which are likely to fail,' too many policies, including those
in the ACA, fall into the likely-to-fail basket.
More importantly, the government needs to ensure that more
empirical evidence is developed. While we know more than we did in
the past about the effectiveness of different kinds of wellness policies,
we have much more to learn if we want to identify policies that are
likely to have a significant impact. As a committee of the Institute of
Medicine recently observed, there are many potential policies to
reduce obesity, but current knowledge does not tell us which policies
can have the biggest impact.9
Proceeding in the face of contrary data or in the absence of
adequate data wastes time and money. It also makes it more difficult
for lawmakers to pass sensible policies. A history of ineffective or
counterproductive mandates can provoke a backlash against good
future mandates.
This Article continues in Part I with some background
information on efforts to promote healthier behavior. Part II
discusses the menu labeling requirements of the ACA and their
insufficient potential for a meaningful impact. Part III considers the
employer wellness provisions of the ACA and how they not only may
be ineffective but also may compromise the ACA's goal of improving
access to health care. The Article concludes with some final
observations-we need more research on strategies to encourage
healthier behavior, and we need policies for healthy behavior that
better reflect scientific understanding.
I. BACKGROUND
Physicians and laypeople alike have long worried about the
lifestyle decisions that individuals make.o How much a person
smokes, exercises, and eats or drinks can have a profound effect on
8. For example, simply providing more information to consumers has little effect on
dietary habits, while financial incentives for a healthier diet appear to be more effective.
See infra Parts II, III.
9. See INST. OF MED., EVALUATING OBESITY PREVENTION EFFORTS: A PLAN FOR
MEASURING PROGRESS 1-3 (Lawrence W. Green et al. eds., 2013). Some scholars have
proposed reporting requirements for employers who offer wellness programs so that
better data are available to assess the effectiveness of wellness programs. See, e.g., Kristin
Madison, Harald Schmidt & Kevin G. Volpp, Using Reporting Requirements to Build an
Evidence Base to Improve Employer Wellness Incentives and Their Regulation, 39 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. (forthcoming Oct. 2014).
10. See generally SANDER L. GILMAN, OBESITY: THE BIOGRAPHY (2010) (discussing
the dietary and other lifestyle prescriptions of Dr. John Henry Kellogg, Ellen G. White,
Sylvester Graham, and Charles William Post in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries).
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length and quality of life. Accordingly, many steps have been taken
by lawmakers to discourage tobacco or alcohol use, promote exercise,
and improve nutrition. The federal tax on cigarettes is now $1.01 per
pack," the blood alcohol threshold for drunk driving charges has
dropped to 0.08% in every state,12 foods purchased at the grocery
store come with a label that lists calories, vitamins, and fat content,13
and many states and cities have launched programs to encourage
healthier lifestyles.14
But public policy is littered with wellness initiatives that seemed
promising when enacted but have not panned out. Consider, for
example, the federal Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990.15
As a result of that statute, consumers can check the nutritional
content of foods that they purchase in a grocery store and ensure that
they are not unwittingly buying items that are high in calories, fat, or
sugar.'" Yet identifying a meaningful impact on obesity rates is
difficult. Some studies have found improvements in diet (e.g., higher
fiber intake)" and modest reductions in body weight'8  from
nutritional labeling, but other studies have found no impact on
obesity.19 And while the increase in obesity rates in the United States
11. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RAISING THE EXCISE TAX ON CIGARETTES:
EFFECTS ON HEALTH AND THE FEDERAL BUDGET 2 (2012).
12. See, e.g., Linda C. Fentiman, A New Form of WMD? Driving with Mobile Device
and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, 81 UMKC L. REV. 133, 163-64 (2012). Early
DUI laws set the blood alcohol threshold at 0.15%. See Neal Shover, William B. Bankston
& J. William Gurley, Responses of the Criminal Justice System to Legislation Providing
More Severe Threatened Sanctions, 14 CRIMINOLOGY 483,484 (1977).
13. See Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat.
2353 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 343(q) (2012)).
14. See, e.g., INSHAPEINDIANA, http://www.inshapeindiana.org (last visited May 7,
2014); Sara Rimer, Philadelphia's Mayor Puts His City on a Diet, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12,
2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/12/us/philadelphia-s-mayor-puts-his-city-on-a-
diet.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
15. Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 343(q) (2012)).
16. See 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(1)(C)-(D) (2012).
17. See Jayachandran N. Variyam, Do Nutrition Labels Improve Dietary Outcomes?,
17 HEALTH ECON. 695, 704 (2008).
18. See Maria L. Loureiro, Steven T. Yen & Rodolfo M. Nayga, Jr., The Effects of
Nutritional Labels on Obesity, 43 AGRIC. ECON. 333, 340 (2012).
19. See, e.g., Andreas C. Drichoutis, Rodolfo M. Nayga, Jr. & Panagiotis Lazaridis,
Can Nutritional Label Use Influence Body Weight Outcomes?, 62 KYKLOS 500, 522 (2009).
While the overall impact of nutritional labeling is limited, labeling is more effective with
some demographic groups than with other groups. See Samantha Goodman et al., Use of
Nutritional Information in Canada: National Trends Between 2004 and 2008, 43 J.
NUTRITION EDUC. & BEHAV. 356, 362 (2011) (finding greater impact for women and
wealthier or better educated individuals).
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slowed between 1999 and 2008,20 it is difficult to attribute the slowing
to the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act. Regulations
implementing the Act took effect in 1992,21 and there was no slowing
in the obesity rate between 1994 and 2000.22 If the Act has had an
important impact, one would think it would have been observable by
2000.
Or consider school-based initiatives to reduce obesity by
promoting more exercise and healthier diets.23 Some interventions
have shown mixed results, while others have not resulted in any
decrease in obesity. For example, a two-year after-school exercise
program in Spain reduced the percentage of girls who were
overweight but not the percentage of boys who were overweight.24 A
two-year program in California of school-based nutrition and exercise
led to more physical exercise and lower weight for boys but not for
girls.25 And a three-year nutrition and exercise program in four U.S.
states led to reduced fat intake and more physical activity but had no
effect on weight. 26 A recent Cochrane review27 of school-based
initiatives and other child obesity programs suggests some benefit, but
20. See Katherine M. Flegal et al., Prevalence and Trends in Obesity Among US
Adults, 1999-2008, 303 JAMA 235, 240 (2010).
21. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Note, Congressional Control over Agency Rulemaking:
The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act's Hammer Provisions, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
149, 168 (1995).
22. See Cynthia L. Ogden & Martha D. Carroll, Prevalence of Overweight, Obesity,
and Extreme Obesity Among Adults: United States, Trends 1960-1962 Through 2007-2008,
NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS (June 2010), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hestat
/obesity-adult 07_08/obesity-adult07_08.htm.
23. These initiatives might include increases in physical activity for children during
physical education classes or at other times during the school day and tasty, low-fat food
items in school cafeterias. See James F. Sallis et al., Environmental Interventions for Eating
and Physical Activity: A Randomized Controlled Trial in Middle Schools, 24 AM. J.
PREVENTIVE MED. 209,210 (2003).
24. See Fernando Salcedo Aguilar et al., Impact of an After-School Physical Activity
Program on Obesity in Children, 157 J. PEDIATRICS 36, 38 (2010).
25. See Sallis et al., supra note 23, at 214-15. The weight data were based on student
reporting and thus may not have been reliable. Id. at 213-14.
26. See Russell V. Luepker et al., Outcomes of a Field Trial to Improve Children's
Dietary Patterns and Physical Activity: The Child and Adolescent Trial for Cardiovascular
Health (CATCH), 275 JAMA 768, 772 (1996).
27. The Cochrane Collaboration undertakes highly regarded reviews of research in
health care and health policy to provide independent assessments of the research. About
Us, COCHRANE COLLABORATION, http://www.cochrane.orglabout-us (last updated Mar.
16, 2014). Their independence makes them more reliable than industry-funded reviews.
See Anders W. Jorgensen, Jorgen Hilden & Peter C. Gotzsche, Cochrane Reviews
Compared with Industry Supported Meta-Analyses and Other Meta-Analyses of the Same
Drugs: Systematic Review, 333 BMJ 782, 782 (2006).
2014] 1641
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the effects are modest-on average, the review found only about a
one percent decrease in body mass index ("BMI").2 8
Unfortunately, while some provisions of the ACA try to
encourage better lifestyle decisions by individuals, these provisions
also are unlikely to succeed. The next two Parts of this Article
consider the ACA's menu labeling requirements and its incentives for
employer wellness programs.
II. MENU LABELING REQUIREMENTS
It is not surprising that Congress would want restaurants to
disclose calorie information on their menus.29 Americans eat more of
their meals away from home than they did in the past, and restaurant
meals typically are higher in calories and fat than are meals eaten at
home.30 Disclosure of calorie content allows consumers to identify
healthier options and choose them instead of meals that are more
likely to make them obese. In addition, if calorie disclosures
encourage consumers to seek healthier options, restaurants should
respond by offering a wider range of healthier meals."
But menu labeling requirements rest on some inaccurate
assumptions. Such requirements assume that people choose higher
calorie options out of misunderstanding or inattention and that full
information will lead them to pick lower calorie options.32 For
example, diners view salads as healthy, low-calorie options and may
not realize that a Jack in the Box Chicken Club Salad can contain
more than 700 calories or that the Chicken Caesar Salad with
"lightly breaded" chicken at Boston's The Gourmet Pizza weighs in at
28. See Elizabeth Waters et al., Interventions for Preventing Obesity in Children,
COCHRANE DATABASE OF SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS, Dec. 2011, at 32-33, available at
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/14651858.CD001871.pub3/full. For a thoughtful
discussion of ways to improve school-based programs, see Lindsay F. Wiley, "No Body
Left Behind": Re-Orienting School-Based Childhood Obesity Interventions, 5 DUKE F. FOR
L. & SOC. CHANGE 97 (2013).
29. See 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5)(H) (2012).
30. See Sara N. Bleich & Lainie Rutkow, Improving Obesity Prevention at the Local
Level-Emerging Opportunities, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1761, 1761 (2013).
31. See Tamara Schulman, Note, Menu Labeling: Knowledge for a Healthier America,
47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 587, 602-03 (2010).
32. See Marion Nestle, Health Care Reform in Action-Calorie Labeling Goes
National, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2343, 2345 (2010); Brent Bernell, Note, The History and
Impact of the New York City Menu Labeling Law, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 839, 842-43
(2010).
33. See 17 Best and Worst Fast-Food Salads, WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/food-
recipes/features/best-and-worst-fast-food-salads?page=2 (last updated Aug. 1, 2011).
[Vol. 921642
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1550 calories.34 With accurate nutritional information, diners could
avoid high-calorie salads and choose low-calorie salads instead. In
other words, labeling requirements assume that people act rationally
when it comes to their own interests and that policy should address
the problem of imperfect understanding that compromises rational
decision making.
However, dietary decisions are more complicated than that. For
example, too much information can compromise decision making (the
information "overload" problem).36 In addition, it often is difficult for
people to exercise self-control when weighing present costs and
benefits with future costs and benefits. On one hand, people may
have trouble delaying gratification; on the other hand, they may be
quick to postpone pain. As a result, people tend to "over-indulge" in
activities that have immediate benefits and delayed costs and to
"under-indulge" in activities that have immediate costs and delayed
benefits.38 In the dietary context, the current gratification of a
decadent dessert may overwhelm the distant pain of obesity-related
illness. Similarly, the current pain of a low-fat diet may overwhelm
the distant benefit of a lowered risk for a heart attack or stroke. In
short, anti-obesity policies will not work unless they respond to the
ways in which decision making is less than rational."
Indeed, studies have demonstrated that placing calorie
information on menus has little to no effect on the meal choices of
diners. Some studies have found modest effects from calorie
information, but the results are mixed. In one study, diners at a fast
food sandwich shop were given calorie information about menu
options as well as information about recommended daily calorie
intake.' The information did not influence the choice between a low-
34. BOSTON PIZZA RESTAURANTS, 2012 ALLERGY & NUTRITION GUIDE 23 (Nov.
2012), available at http://bostons-media.s3.amazonaws.com/MenuNutritional
Information.pdf.
35. See Julie S. Downs, George Loewenstein & Jessica Wisdom, Strategies for
Promoting Healthier Food Choices, 99 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROC. 159, 159 (2009).
36. See Martin J. Eppler and Jeanne Mengis, The Concept of Information Overload: A
Review of Literature from Organization Science, Accounting, Marketing, MIS, and Related
Disciplines, 20 INFO. Soc'Y 325, 326 (2004).
37. See Kristin M. Madison, Kevin G. Volpp & Scott D. Halpern, The Law, Policy &
Ethics of Employers' Use of Financial Incentives to Improve Health, 39 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 450, 452-54 (2011); Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, The Economics of
Immediate Gratification, 13 J. BEHAv. DECISION MAKING 233,234 (2000).
38. See O'Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 37, at 234.
39. Tobacco taxes respond to the problem of short- and long-term thinking by giving
smokers a short-term pain to compensate for the short-term benefit of a cigarette.
40. See Downs et al., supra note 35, at 160.
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calorie and high-calorie sandwich, but it did influence choices about
side orders so that total calorie intake decreased by about fifty
calories.4 1 Other studies have not found a reduction in calorie intake.
For example, in a study at a Chinese fast food restaurant in North
Carolina, some customers were given calorie counts while others were
not.4 2 The information about caloric content did not affect ordering
behavior.43
More importantly, while some experimental studies have yielded
positive results from calorie disclosure, legislative requirements have
not. For example, after Seattle passed a calorie disclosure mandate
for restaurants, researchers observed meal choices at a Mexican fast
food chain." Customers did not reduce their caloric intake as a result
of the requirement.45 In a study of fast food dining in New York City
before and after the implementation of the city's calorie disclosure
mandate," there was no overall change in caloric intake,47 though
there were decreases at some restaurant chains and increases at
another.48
Might calorie disclosure fail because diners do not have a
benchmark for comparison? That is, if consumers overestimate the
number of calories they can eat without gaining weight, they may be
too willing to order a high-calorie meal at a restaurant. And some
experimental studies have found a benefit from information about
recommended daily calorie intake.4 9
41. Id. at 161; see also Christina A. Roberto et al., Evaluating the Impact of Menu
Labeling on Food Choices and Intake, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 312, 316 (2010) (finding
that calorie information on a menu led to diners ordering meals with fewer calories).
42. See Janet Schwartz et al., Inviting Consumers to Downsize Fast-Food Portions
Significantly Reduces Calorie Consumption, 31 HEALTH AFF. 399, 400 (2012).
43. See id. at 404.
44. See Eric A. Finkelstein et al., Mandatory Menu Labeling in One Fast-Food Chain
in King County, Washington, 40 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 122, 122-23 (2011) (studying
meal choices at seven of the chain's locations in Seattle and seven locations in the
suburbs).
45. See id. at 124-25.
46. See N.Y.C., N.Y., HEALTH CODE § 81.50 (2013).
47. See Tamara Dumanovsky et al., Changes in Energy Content of Lunchtime
Purchases from Fast Food Restaurants After Introduction of Calorie Labelling: Cross
Sectional Customer Surveys 1, BMJ (July 26, 2011), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc
/articles/PMC3144313/ (studying menu choices at 168 locations for eleven fast food
chains); Brian Elbel et al., Calorie Labeling and Food Choices: A First Look at the Effects
on Low-Income People in New York City, 28 HEALTH AFF. w1110, w1110 (2009),
available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/28/6/w1110.full.html (studying menu
choices at fourteen fast food locations in New York City and five in Newark).
48. See Dumanovsky et al., supra note 47, at 4.
49. See, e.g., Roberto et al., supra note 41, at 316. Other studies have not found a
benefit when diners have been given recommended levels for calorie intake and even have
1644 [Vol. 92
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Unfortunately, providing information about recommended daily
or per meal calorie intake does not seem to be very effective in real-
world settings. In one study, researchers studied menu choices at two
McDonald's franchises in New York City to test the impact of calorie
information that was supplemented by recommended calorie intakes
per meal and per day."o The study was conducted both before and
after New York City implemented its menu labeling requirements."
Consistent with the previously mentioned study in New York, the
calorie information did not lead to a reduction in caloric intake.52 In
fact, overweight persons increased their calorie intake after the menu
labeling ordinance went into effect." Moreover, providing
recommended calorie intakes resulted in a modest increase in calories
consumed.54 However, the increase from the recommended calorie
intakes fell slightly short of statistical significance.s5
While calorie disclosures appear to generate little benefit as a
tool for combating obesity, other policies may have greater impact. In
a study of food purchasing decisions, researchers compared a "tax"
on high-calorie foods with a "subsidy" for low-calorie foods.56 They
found that while the subsidy resulted in the purchase of foods with a
higher total calorie content-study subjects apparently used their
subsidies to buy more food-the tax resulted in the purchase of foods
with a lower total calorie content." This study provides support for
policy proposals such as a tax on sugary soft drinks, which is
consistent with the previously discussed realities of individual
found a perverse effect, with diners eating more when informed about recommended
calorie intake. See Downs et al., supra note 35, at 162.
50. See Julie S. Downs et al., Supplementing Menu Labeling with Calorie
Recommendations to Test for Facilitation Effects, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1604, 1605
(2013).
51. The part of the study that was conducted after implementation of the New York
City ordinance took place before the city supplemented its calorie labeling mandate with
an advertisement campaign to inform New Yorkers about recommended daily calorie
intake. See id.
52. Id. at 1606-07.
53. Id. at 1607.
54. Id.
55. Id. While studies have not found a meaningful impact from menu labeling
requirements, a significant impact is still possible. It may take time for consumers to adjust
their dietary habits or larger studies may be needed to provide an accurate reflection of
the requirements' impact. In addition, it may be that calorie disclosures are important but
need to be supplemented by additional measures. Perhaps people need both accurate
information about their food options and incentives to choose wisely among the options.
56. See Leonard H. Epstein et al., The Influence of Taxes and Subsidies on Energy
Purchased in an Experimental Purchasing Study, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 406, 406 (2010).
57. Id. at 412-13.
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decision making." Imposing a tax on unhealthy foods supplies an
immediate disincentive to the consumption of those foods and can
overcome the difficulty people have in postponing the gratification
that they enjoy from the foods. That said, more data are needed
before we can come to a firm conclusion about the benefits of food
taxes-a tax on some unhealthy foods could simply cause people to
substitute other unhealthy foods.5 9
Studies also have found good results from efforts to exploit
consumer responses to "nudges."' In the North Carolina Chinese fast
food restaurant study, researchers found that diners rarely would ask
for a half serving of rice to go with their entr6e.61 However, if servers
invited diners to choose a half serving of the rice, then many chose it,
and they did not compensate for the smaller serving by eating more
calories from other foods at the meal.62 In the fast food sandwich
study, dining choices often were influenced by the arrangement of
sandwich options on the menu. Research subjects were given a one-
page "featured subs" menu, along with a larger menu with more
58. For further discussion of taxes on less healthy foods, see James G. Hodge, Jr. et
al., New Frontiers in Obesity Control: Innovative Public Health Legal Interventions, 5
DUKE F. FOR L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 4-12 (2013); Jennifer L. Pomeranz, A Conditional
Funding Strategy to Address the Modern Food Environment: From Public Health
Prevention to State and Local Preemption, 5 DUKE F. FOR L. & SOC. CHANGE 39, 63
(2013) (proposing that revenues raised from the taxes be used to fund health-promoting
programs).
59. Indeed, there are studies that suggest such a substitution effect. See Jason M.
Fletcher, David E. Frisvold & Nathan Tefft, The Effects of Soft Drink Taxes on Child and
Adolescent Consumption and Weight Outcomes, 94 J. PUB. ECON. 967, 968 (2010). If
substitution effects occur, the taxes would not improve health but would carry the
disadvantage that taxes on foods and beverages are regressive and have a disproportionate
effect on the poor. Other studies also suggest that the effects of taxes are complicated. For
example, in a study of dining at a restaurant, a "tax" in the form of higher prices for less
healthy choices did not make a difference, but a tax plus information about fat content
did. See Avni M. Shah et al., Will a Fat Tax be an Effective 'Nudge'?: Evidence that
Normative Signals Augment the Impact of Financial Incentives to Eat Healthy Food (Apr.
16, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The
absence of an effect from the higher pricing alone may reflect the fact that higher prices
sometimes are interpreted as representing higher quality. Research also suggests that taxes
should be imposed at the wholesale level rather than the retail level. Consumers typically
are more sensitive to the posted price of a product rather than the price they will pay once
a sales tax is added. Raj Chetty, Adam Looney & Kory Kroft, Salience and Taxation:
Theory and Evidence, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1145, 1146 (2009).
60. For a general discussion of nudges, see RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS
(rev. ed. 2009).
61. See Schwartz et al., supra note 42, at 402.
62. See id. When servers offered the half serving, they also informed customers that
the half serving came with 200 fewer calories. Id. at 401.
63. See Downs et al., supra note 35, at 160.
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sandwich choices." There were three versions of the featured subs
menu.65 One had all low-calorie choices, one had all high-calorie
choices, and the third had a mix of low- and high-calorie choices.66
Compared to diners who received the mixed menu, diners who
received the low-calorie menu were forty-eight percent more likely to
choose a low-calorie sandwich while diners who received the high-
calorie menu were forty-seven percent less likely to choose a low-
calorie sandwich. 7
What do we learn from our understanding of individual decision
making, the studies of anti-obesity policies, and other information?
This is a very complicated issue. It is not a simple matter to find
effective anti-obesity programs. Indeed, even when overweight
people lose weight on a diet, no more than about twenty percent are
able to maintain the lower weight for at least one year.' And even for
the policies that seem to work, we do not know whether they actually
have a meaningful impact. For example, consider the Chinese fast
food restaurant study that found a reduction in calorie intake when
customers were offered a one-half serving of the rice.69 Researchers
found that the diners consumed fewer calories at the restaurant, but
we do not know whether the diners compensated for the caloric
reduction by consuming more calories at snacks or meals later in the
day.
Given the uncertainties, a couple of strategies make sense. First,
funding for obesity research is critical. We know much more about
correlations than about cause and effect. Are people obese because
they are sedentary, or are people sedentary because they are obese? 0
We simply do not have a good handle on the reliability of our
understanding of obesity. And this is typical of medical problems.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 161.
68. The twenty percent figure is based on maintaining a weight loss of at least ten
percent of body weight for at least one year. See Rena R. Wing & Suzanne Phelan, Long-
Term Weight Loss Maintenance, 82 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 222S, 222S (2005).
69. See Schwartz et al., supra note 42, at 402.
70. There is good reason to believe that a sedentary lifestyle causes obesity, but we do
not have enough data to exclude the possibility that obesity leads to a sedentary lifestyle.
See Frank B. Hu et al., Television Watching and Other Sedentary Behaviors in Relation to
Risk of Obesity and Type 2 Diabetes Mellitus in Women, 289 JAMA 1785, 1790-91 (2003).
And there are examples in medicine where correlations have resulted in mistaken
inferences about cause and effect. See, e.g., Earl S. Ford & Carl J. Caspersen, Sedentary
Behaviour and Cardiovascular Disease: A Review of Prospective Studies, 41 INT'L J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY 1338, 1348 (2012) (discussing mistaken beliefs about the health benefits
of vitamins).
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Recall that as late as the 1980s, medical experts believed that ulcers in
the stomach and small intestine were caused by stress, smoking,
alcohol, and a variety of other factors.7 1 Then, researchers discovered
the bacterial cause for ulcers.7 2 Recent research also suggests an
important role for intestinal bacteria in contributing to obesity.
Policymakers can design more effective programs if they better
understand the reasons why people become and remain obese.
In addition to promoting more research, anti-obesity programs
should take advantage of the "laboratory of state experimentation." 74
In an environment in which scientific understanding is imperfect and
optimal policies are uncertain, it makes a good deal of sense to let
states (and cities) try a variety of approaches before having the
federal government impose a standard approach across the country.
For example, rather than having Congress impose a national tax on
junk food, a few cities or states could experiment with such a tax. Or
rather than having Congress enact a national ban on the sale of sugar-
sweetened beverages to children, a few cities or states could enact
such bans.76
III. EMPLOYER WELLNESS PROGRAMS
While the ACA's menu labeling requirements will probably have
little or no effect on obesity rates, the Act's employer-wellness
provisions77 hold more promise for benefit. Well-designed wellness
programs can reduce obesity, as well as smoking and other unhealthy
71. See James McGuigan, Peptic Ulcer, in HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL
MEDICINE 1371, 1374, 1377 (Kurt J. Isselbacher et al. eds., 9th ed. 1980).
72. See David Y. Graham et al., Effect of Treatment of Helicobacter Pylori Infection
on the Long-Term Recurrence of Gastric or Duodenal Ulcer: A Randomized, Controlled
Study, 116 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 705, 708 (1992).
73. It seems that obese people have a different range of bacteria in their intestinal
tract than normal weight individuals and that weight reduction may follow from changing
the range of bacteria in the intestines of obese persons. See, e.g., Judith Aron-Wisnewsky,
Joel Dor6 & Karine Clement, The Importance of the Gut Microbiota After Bariatric
Surgery, 9 NATURE REV. GASTROENTEROLOGY HEPATOLOGY 590, 590 (2012); Vanessa
K. Ridaura et al., Gut Microbiota from Twins Discordant for Obesity Modulate
Metabolism in Mice, 341 SCI. 1079, 1079 (2013).
74. Cf New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the importance of state experimentation in social and economic
science).
75. For a helpful discussion of a range of anti-obesity policies, see Hodge, Jr. et al.,
supra note 58. An important consideration in choosing among different policies is whether
they can be converted into legal requirements. Some policies are difficult to mandate;
others arouse strong political opposition.
76. For discussion of such a ban, see id. at 30-37.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(A) (2012).
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behaviors." However, if implemented poorly, the wellness provisions
may not only fail to improve health; they also could compromise the
ACA's goal of making health care coverage more affordable.
Wellness programs include both screening and intervention
initiatives.79 Screening activities include (a) questionnaires that ask
about exercise, nutrition, and other factors that affect individual
health and (b) clinical measurements of weight, blood pressure, blood
glucose levels, and other data that provide information about an
employee's health risks. 0 Intervention activities include counseling to
encourage more exercise and better diet, smoking cessation
programs, free immunizations in the workplace, free or subsidized
gym memberships, and healthy food options in workplace cafeterias
or vending machines."
To encourage enrollment in employer wellness programs, the
ACA extends provisions in the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act' that allow employers to promote program
participation with financial incentives." For incentives that are tied
simply to participation, there are no limits on the magnitude of the
incentives. Employers can reward their employees with $50, $500, or
$5,000 if they sign up for workplace wellness programs.' Thus, a
company could impose a $5,000 premium surcharge on employees
who do not participate or offer a $5,000 premium cut to employees
who do participate. On the other hand, if employers want to base
financial incentives on the satisfaction of health targets (e.g., loss of
weight or lowering of blood glucose level), then premium surcharges,
premium reductions, or other financial incentives are permitted only
up to thirty percent of the total cost of employee-only coverage (or
for smoking cessation targets, up to fifty percent of the total cost of
coverage)."
78. See SOEREN MATTKE ET AL., WORKPLACE WELLNESS PROGRAMS STUDY:
FINAL REPORT xvii, 43-51 (RAND 2013).
79. See id. at 21.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 22-23.
82. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat.
1936 (1996); Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group Health Plans,
78 Fed. Reg. 33,158, 33,158-59, 33,166-67 (June 3, 2013).
83. See Jill R. Horwitz, Brenna D. Kelly & John E. DiNardo, Wellness Incentives in
the Workplace: Cost Savings Through Cost Shifting to Unhealthy Workers, 32 HEALTH
AFF. 468, 469-70 (2013).
84. Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group Health Plans, 78
Fed. Reg. at 33,166-67.
85. Id. at 33,167. Thus if the total cost of coverage (including employer and employee
contributions) is $5,000, an employer could employ financial incentives up to $1,500. If
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There are protections in the ACA for employees who may not be
able to meet a wellness program's targets. For instance, if it would be
medically inadvisable for the employee to try to meet the standard, or
if a medical condition would make satisfaction of a target
unreasonably difficult, the employee must be exempted from the
financial incentive or be given reasonable alternative standards.8 6 If
the program sets a BMI below the obesity threshold of thirty as a
target," employees might be given an alternative standard of losing a
certain percentage or amount of their weight." That way, the
employee with a BMI of forty would not be greatly disadvantaged
compared to an employee with a BMI of thirty-one and also would
not be expected to accomplish an unrealistic goal."
The wellness program provisions raise two important concerns.
First, employers may link financial incentives to wellness programs
that are not effective. An employee might make a good faith effort
and still not meet the program's goal for weight loss, blood sugar
control, or other health metric. To be sure, the ACA requires that
when employers implement wellness programs with financial
incentives tied to the meeting of health status targets, the programs
must be "reasonably designed to promote health or prevent
disease."" But many employer wellness programs may do little to
improve the health status of employees,9' and it is not clear that the
family members are eligible for the financial incentives, then the maximum incentive
would be thirty percent of the cost of family coverage. In addition to capping the amount
of financial incentives, the ACA includes other protections for employees. For example,
proposed ACA regulations "require that health-contingent wellness programs be
reasonably designed to promote health or prevent disease, not be overly burdensome, not
be a subterfuge for discrimination based on a health factor, and not be highly suspect in
the method chosen to promote health or prevent disease." Horwitz et al., supra note 83, at
470 (internal quotation marks omitted). The ACA also allows the Secretaries of Labor,
Health and Human Services, and the Treasury to raise the incentive cap from thirty
percent to fifty percent. Madison et al., supra note 37, at 451 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-
4(j)(3)(A) (2012)).
86. See Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group Health Plans, 78
Fed. Reg. at 33,177, 33,182.
87. While persons with a BMI of thirty or more are considered obese, persons with a
BMI of at least twenty-five but less than thirty are considered overweight. See MATrKE ET
AL., supra note 78, at 15.
88. See Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group Health Plans,
78 Fed. Reg. at 33,166, 33,178, 33,184, 33,189.
89. See Madison et al., supra note 37, at 457.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(B) (2012).
91. See Karen Chan Osilla et al., Systematic Review of the Impact of Worksite Wellness
Programs, 18 AM. J. MANAGED CARE e68, e78 (2012) (finding positive outcomes only one
half of the time for wellness programs that were studied with a randomized controlled
trial).
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ACA's reasonable design requirement will weed out those
programs.9
Moreover, even when programs are effective, their results may
be modest. Researchers like to see a reduction of at least five to ten
percent of body weight from an anti-obesity program,93 and some
participants in some programs reach that goal. For example, a RAND
study of wellness programs at five employers found that continuous
participation in a weight control program for five years would result
in cumulative weight loss of six to seven percent of body weight for
the average participant (about thirteen pounds for someone who
starts out at 200 pounds).94 However, many programs have fallen
short of the five to ten percent weight loss goal. Consider some
illustrative examples:
In a New Zealand study, researchers tested a "small-changes"
intervention for overweight or obese employees in two workplaces.95
Small change interventions promote relatively modest changes in
lifestyle on the theory that individuals are more likely to make small
changes than large ones and that the impact of small changes can
accumulate over time to create substantial long-term impacts.96 In the
study, participants submitted food and exercise diaries, and a team of
health professionals selected a set of health behavior changes tailored
to each participant's needs." Changes might include replacement of
sugar-containing drinks with water or diet drinks, brushing teeth after
dinner to signal the end of eating for the evening, or taking
"snacktivity" breaks (breaks that involve brief periods of physical
exercise instead of eating a snack)." At four-week intervals during
the first twelve weeks of the intervention, more small changes were
added to each participant's program. 9 For some of the participants,
the twelve-week small changes segment of the intervention was
92. Enforcement will depend on how strictly the "reasonably designed" requirement
is interpreted, the enthusiasm of particular presidential administrations for enforcement of
the requirement, and the extent to which Republicans in Congress continue their efforts to
limit funding for the enforcement of the ACA.
93. Weight losses of at least five to ten percent can yield a meaningful improvement in
health. See Rena R. Wing & James 0. Hill, Successful Weight Loss Maintenance, 21 ANN.
REV. NUTRITION 323, 325 (2001).
94. See MATTKE ET AL., supra note 78, at 47-50.
95. Caryn Zinn et al., A "Small-Changes" Workplace Weight Loss and Maintenance
Program: Examination of Weight and Health Outcomes, 54 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL.
MED. 1230,1230 (2012).
96. See id.
97. See id. at 1231.
98. Id. at 1232.
99. See id. at 1231.
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followed by a nine-month maintenance segment.'" At the end of the
year, only one-third of the participants had lost at least five percent of
their weight (compared to no workers in the control group), with the
average worker losing three and one-half percent of weight. 01
Another study yielded even smaller changes in weight. The study
involved employees at a medical center in Missouri, with employees
at one worksite undergoing a health assessment only, while
employees at a second worksite underwent the same health
assessment plus an array of interventions over a year's time. The
interventions included nutrition components (e.g., healthy foods
snack carts and on-site Weight Watchers meetings), exercise
components (e.g., pedometers and on-site exercise programs), and
participation rewards (e.g., kitchen gadgets and exercise gear).02
While all employees were eligible for the study,"3 the average
participant had a BMI in the obese range (i.e., BMI of 30 or more). 0"
The changes in weight between the two sites were statistically
significant,' but the magnitude of change was small-participants at
the intervention site lost on average just under one percent of their
weight, while participants at the assessment-only site gained on
average less than one percent of their weight.106
Even these modest results may be skewed by a selection bias.
When wellness programs are voluntary and lack financial incentives
for participation, enrollment tends to be low. According to a RAND
study, fewer than one in two employees participate in wellness
screening programs, fewer than one in five participate in wellness
interventions, and fewer than one in nine participate in weight
management programs.10 The employees who do enroll are likely to
be especially motivated, and their experiences may not be
representative of what the wellness programs can achieve when
expanded to all employees.
100. See id.
101. Id. at 1234-35.
102. See Susan B. Racette et al., Worksite Opportunities for Wellness (WOW): Effects
on Cardiovascular Disease Risk Factors After 1 Year, 49 PREVENTIVE MED. 108, 110-11
(2009).
103. Id. at 109.
104. The average BMI at the assessment-only site was 31.1 at the beginning of the
study, while the average BMI at the intervention site was 34.5 at the beginning of the
study. Id. at 110.
105. See id. at 110 tbl.2, 111.
106. See id. at 110 tbl.2. The intervention did result in more substantial reductions in
risk factors for heart disease compared to the reductions in weight. See id. at 112.
107. See MATTKE ET AL., supra note 78, at 37-38 (discussing data from a national
survey of employers).
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Indeed, randomized controlled trials of wellness programs have
yielded weaker results than have other kinds of studies. Consider, for
example, the results of a review of studies measuring the effectiveness
of workplace wellness programs.'" There were thirteen studies that
evaluated exercise programs, and sixty-two percent of the studies
found a positive effect from the programs." 9 However, a positive
effect was found in only forty-three percent of the studies that
employed a randomized controlled trial."0 Among weight
management programs, only three out of the six with a randomized
controlled trial design found a positive impact on weight, and none of
the positive three had more than 100 participants."
While employer wellness programs to date have not delivered as
much benefit as we might hope, researchers have identified certain
features of programs that are more likely than alternative strategies
to show success. For example, financial or other incentives may be
able to encourage successful outcomes. In addition, incentives are
more effective when implemented on a frequent basis. A weekly
penalty or reward of $10 has a greater impact than an annual penalty
or reward of $500.112 As discussed earlier, people respond more
readily to immediate rewards and penalties than to delayed rewards
and penalties.13 Frequent financial rewards and penalties can help
overcome the tendency to over-indulge in the immediate gratification
of unhealthy food whose harms materialize only in the future. And
financial incentives need to be salient-a separate check is more
effective than an insurance premium rebate that is buried in a
reduced payroll deduction.114
One important question about wellness programs lies in their
long-term effectiveness. While some programs have had good short-
term results, the beneficial effects tend not to persist over the longer
term. In one study, for example, participants enrolled in a wellness
initiative to promote a healthy diet, physical activity, and stress
108. See Osilla et al., supra note 91, at e69.
109. Id.
110. See id.
111. See id. at e70.
112. See Kevin G. Volpp et al., Redesigning Employee Health Incentives-Lessons from
Behavioral Economics, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 388, 389 (2011). Indeed, there is no firm
evidence that charging higher health care premiums to persons who smoke or are
overweight causes them to stop smoking or lose weight. See id. at 388.
113. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text; Madison et al., supra note 37, at
452-54 (2011).
114. It is usually more effective, for example, to send a reward check for $100 than to
provide a discount of $100 in health care premiums that are deducted from a person's
paycheck. See Volpp et al., supra note 112, at 389.
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reduction." There were weekly meetings for three months followed
by a monthly maintenance program."' After three months,
participants had lost about five pounds on average while members of
the control group had gained about one and a half pounds."'
However, the weight loss was not sustained at a twelve-month follow-
up."' In another study that involved a wellness program for patients
at a health care facility rather than employees in a workplace,
researchers examined the effectiveness of two kinds of financial
incentives-lotteries and deposit contractsn 9-at encouraging weight
loss. Both incentives were effective at promoting weight loss during
the four months of the study.120 Once the intervention ended,
however, the weight loss gradually dissipated.121 While study
participants weighed significantly less at seven months than at the
beginning of the study, their weight losses were not significantly
different from the amount of weight lost by a control group in the
study.122 A similar study conducted over an eight-month period
yielded similar results.123 Patients who participated in the lottery or
deposit contract arms of the study lost significantly more weight
during the eight months than did control patients, but there was no
significant difference in weight loss between incentive patients and
control patients nine months after the incentives ended. 24
An important question left open by these studies is whether an
intervention needs to be maintained indefinitely or whether it just
needs to be maintained for periods longer than a few months or a
115. See Kalleen Barham et al., Diabetes Prevention and Control in the Workplace: A
Pilot Project for County Employees, 17(3) J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT. & PRAC. 233, 233
(2011).
116. Id. at 234.
117. See id. at 236.
118. See id. On the other hand, improvements in "waist circumference and healthy
lifestyle behaviors" were sustained at the twelve-month follow-up. Id. at 240.
119. See Kevin G. Volpp et al., Financial-Incentive Based Approaches for Weight Loss:
A Randomized Trial, 300 JAMA 2631, 2631 (2008). In the lottery part of the study,
participants would be entered in a daily lottery if they had reached their weight loss goal.
Id. at 2633. Lottery entrants had a twenty percent chance of winning $10 and a one percent
chance of winning $100. In the deposit contract part of the study, participants contributed
up to $3 per day in a pool with an additional contribution from the study. Id. at 2632. For
each day that participants met their weight loss goals, they would receive their deposit and
the matching dollars back. Id. at 2633.
120. Id. at 2634-35.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 2635.
123. See Leslie K. John et al., Financial Incentives for Extended Weight Loss: A
Randomized, Controlled Trial, 26 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 621, 621 (2011).
124. Id. at 625.
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year to result in a long-term change in participant behavior. 125 Of
course, we should not be surprised to learn that interventions might
be needed indefinitely. Treatment of high blood pressure or diabetes
also needs to be maintained indefinitely.12 6
Another important question is how to balance the trade-offs with
different kinds of incentives. For instance, principles of loss aversion
tell us that "penalties" are more effective than "rewards." The desire
to avoid a loss is more powerful than the desire to realize a gain.27 On
the other hand, people generally believe that rewards for healthy
behavior are fairer than penalties for unhealthy behavior.128 Hence,
efforts to implement penalties may result in disaffected employees.
There also are considerations of efficiency. Penalty programs can be
targeted at employees who would benefit from a change in behavior,
while reward programs end up making payments to employees who
do not need an incentive to engage in the desired behavior.129
In addition to concerns about wellness program effectiveness and
efficiency, there are important concerns about equity. In particular,
the financial incentives for wellness programs may undermine the
ACA's goal of making sure that all Americans have access to
affordable health care coverage, regardless of their health status.13 0 A
key achievement of the ACA was to prohibit insurers from charging
higher premiums, or denying coverage altogether, to individuals with
preexisting medical conditions.'' Discrimination on the basis of
health status was to become a thing of the past. But consider the
implications of a financial incentive for obese employees to lower
their BMI below thirty or at least to lose a specified percentage or
amount of weight. Assuming a $5,000 cost of coverage, obese
employees could face a surcharge of $1,500 for their health care
coverage. 32 Similarly, employees with diabetes or hypertension could
face an annual surcharge of $1,500. Persons with health problems may
lose much of the protection promised by the ACA and other federal
125. See Leslie K. John et al., Empirical Observations on Longer-Term Use of
Incentives for Weight Loss, 55 PREVENTIVE MED. S68, S74 (2012).
126. There may be an important drawback to indefinite financial incentives-people
may become dependent on incentives to adopt healthy behaviors. See Madison et al.,
supra note 37, at 453.
127. See id. at 454.
128. See id. at 458; Volpp et al., supra note 112, at 389-90.
129. See Volpp et al., supra note 112, at 390.
130. See id. at 389.
131. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(a) (2012).
132. See Matt Lamkin, Health Care Reform, Wellness Programs, and the Erosion of
Informed Consent, 101 KY. L.J. 435, 444-45 (2013); Volpp et al., supra note 112, at 389.
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statutes (e.g., the Americans with Disabilities Act).'33 In addition,
health problems are more common in low-income persons for whom
the surcharges will be especially burdensome.1 34 Wellness programs
also are likely to disproportionately affect minorities (who are more
likely to be overweight).135
A recent review of wellness programs confirms the concerns
about the programs' equity. Jill Horwitz and colleagues considered
claims by employers that their wellness programs reduced employer
health care costs by promoting healthier employee behavior.13 6 In
fact, the reduction in employer costs may simply reflect the fact that
workers with higher risks for illness paid more for their health care
coverage.'37
This result is not surprising. When choosing among wellness
program options, employers can choose between "positive"
133. See Jessica L. Roberts, "Healthism": A Critique of the Antidiscrimination
Approach to Health Insurance and Health-Care Reform, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1159, 1194-
95. See generally Carrie Griffin Basas, What's Bad About Wellness?: What the Disability
Rights Perspective Offers About the Limitations of Wellness, 39(5) J. HEALTH POL'Y, POL.
& L. (forthcoming Oct. 2014) (describing how current wellness programs are biased
against people with disabilities). The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") can be
found at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012). Individuals with a disability such as diabetes,
hypertension, or severe obesity will be in a better position than individuals who are
overweight but not obese to invoke the protections of the ADA. However, even
individuals with disabilities may not receive much protection from the ADA because of
the ADA's exemptions for insurance policies. See Seff v. Broward Cnty., 691 F.3d 1221,
1223-24 (11th Cir. 2012); Michelle M. Mello & Meredith B. Rosenthal, Wellness Programs
and Lifestyle Discrimination-The Legal Limits, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 192, 194-95
(2008). Lower-income persons also may find it more difficult to avoid penalties because
they may not be able to afford healthier foods or pay for a babysitter while they work out
at a gym. See Madison et al., supra note 37, at 456.
134. See Horwitz et al., supra note 83, at 473. Ironically, individuals who receive their
insurance through their employer would be worse off than individuals who purchase their
insurance on an exchange and who would not be subject to employer wellness program
incentives. However, they could be subject to wellness programs sponsored by their
insurers under the ACA's wellness program demonstration project. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-
4(1) (2012). Cost savings may not even result from wellness programs. In a careful study of
a wellness intervention by a major St. Louis-based hospital system, researchers found that
the intervention yielded a twelve percent decrease in hospitalizations but no overall
change in health care costs. See Gautam Gowrisankaran et al., A Hospital System's
Wellness Program Linked to Health Plan Enrollment Cut Hospitalizations but Not Overall
Costs, 32 HEALTH AFF. 477, 480 (2013). The reduction in inpatient spending was matched
by an increase in outpatient spending plus the costs for the intervention. See id.
135. See Anna Kirkland, Critical Perspectives on Wellness, 39(5) J. HEALTH POL'Y,
POL. & L. (forthcoming Oct. 2014). Wellness programs are difficult for women and lower-
income persons because they may have less discretionary time for wellness initiatives-
either because of child-rearing responsibilities or the need to work multiple jobs. See id.
136. See Horwitz et al., supra note 83, at 468-69.
137. See id. at 469.
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investments in employee health and "negative" penalties for
unhealthy workers, such as premium surcharges. If an employer
chooses to invest in better employee health, there is no guarantee that
the employer will reap any benefit. Healthier employees may leave
for better job opportunities or demand higher wages because of their
greater marketability, and the health benefits of wellness programs
may not materialize for many years.138 On the other hand, penalties
for unhealthy workers can offset their higher health care costs in the
short term and discourage unhealthy individuals from seeking or
retaining jobs with the employer.139
I mentioned at the outset of this Article that there is much more
that we do not know than we do know about wellness policies, and
that applies to the effects of employer wellness programs. Employer
wellness programs reflect in large part the assumption that
improvements in risk factors for poor health will result in
improvements in health-people will suffer less from disease and live
longer, it is thought, if they lose weight, lower their blood sugar, or
control their blood pressure. But that is not necessarily true.
Important trials of approaches to reduce blood sugar and other risk
factors for complications of diabetes yielded meaningful
improvements in the risk factors without improvements in overall
health.140 Indeed, greater control of risk factors can sometimes result
in a worsening of health status.14'
On the other hand, there may be unexpected benefits from
wellness interventions. In the Missouri workplace study, 42 small
reductions in weight were accompanied by more substantial
reductions in risk factors for heart disease.'4' Similarly, in a study that
looked not only at objective measures of health status but also at how
participants described their health status, there were benefits that
138. See generally Robert Fannion & Scott L. Greer, I'll Be Gone, You'll Be Gone:
Why American Employers Underinvest in Health, 39(5) J. HEALTH POL'Y, POL. & L.
(forthcoming Oct. 2014) (describing how wellness programs affect employers differently
depending on the extent to which their workforce is stable or mobile).
139. Id.
140. See Horwitz et al., supra note 83, at 472 (citing a Cochrane review of diabetes
studies, BIANCA HEMMINGSEN ET AL., TARGETING INTENSIVE GLYCAEMIC CONTROL
VERSUS TARGETING CONVENTIONAL GLYCAEMIC CONTROL FOR TYPE 2 DIABETES
MELLITUS, COCHRANE DATABASE OF SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS 2013, Issue 11. Art. No.:
CD008143, available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/14651858.CD008143
.pub3/abstract).
141. Id. at 472.
142. See Racette et al., supra note 102.
143. See id at 112.
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exceeded what might be expected from the degree of weight loss.'*
The researchers collected participant self-reports of "health-related
quality of life" ("HRQL"), 145 and they found that modest weight loss
led to improvements in HRQL.146 The participants reported that they
were functioning more effectively, both physically and mentally.147
Moreover, the improvements were sustained even for participants
who were not able to maintain a weight loss of more than five percent
of body weight.14
There is much to be learned about the effects of employer
wellness programs and how to best design them. We need more
research and more pilot testing of wellness programs before we
encourage broad implementation.
CONCLUSION
The drafters of the ACA and other policymakers are correct to
encourage healthier lifestyle decisions. Many Americans would do
well to exercise more, consume fewer calories, and eat more fruits
and vegetables. However, our understanding of how we can
effectively promote healthier lifestyle decisions is quite limited. As a
result, many wellness policy initiatives have had little impact. The
menu labeling and employer wellness program provisions in the ACA
may not be effective either and, in the case of employer wellness
provisions, may even be counterproductive.
Governments need to do a better job at making sure their
interventions reflect current scientific understanding, and they need
to ensure that more research is conducted to improve our
understanding. Otherwise, much money and time will be wasted on
ineffective interventions, many people may be penalized unfairly, and
the public may become resistant to the adoption of interventions that
are, in fact, effective.
While the specific provisions in the ACA may not pan out,
another part of the ACA could do much to promote healthier
lifestyle decisions. The ACA established a Patient-Centered
144. See Bryan Blissmer et al., Health-Related Quality of Life Following a Clinical
Weight Loss Intervention Among Overweight and Obese Adults: Intervention and 24 Month
Follow-Up Effects 1, HEALTH & QUALITY LIFE OUTCOMES (2006), http://www.ncbi.nlm
.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1553435/.
145. "Health-related quality of life" refers to self-reported assessments of the extent to
which medical problems have physical, psychological, and social consequences. See id. at 2.
146. See id. at 4.
147. See id. at 5.
148. See id. at 1.
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